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In May 2012 Alex Sharpe, Professor of Law at Keele University, UK, visited Lund 
University where she participated in a series of seminars and workshops organised 
around a central motif in her work: the legal outsider. As part of her visit she pre-
sented a version of a paper recently published in the Modern Law Review1 titled 
»Transgender Marriage and the Legal Obligation to Disclose Gender History«. The 
paper focused on and challenged the legal and wider cultural framing of non-
disclosure of gender history as harmful and as unethical. The paper is her latest in-
tervention and forms part of a substantial body of writing around transgender/law 
issues. This corpus includes her book: Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of 
Law (2002),2 the first to offer a critical treatment of the subject. In a separate work-
shop she approached the legal constitution and regulation of outsiders through the 
lens of the monster. This event served to introduce her latest book, Foucault's Mon-
sters and the Challenge of Law.3 In contrast to a focus on one specific group of legal 
outsiders (transgender people), Foucault’s Monsters offers instead a deeper theoretical 
analysis and a much broader historical sweep. Drawing on Foucault, the book pre-
sents a theoretical framework for understanding the legal production of outsiders 
and a history of the legal category monster. The history presented works both as a 
history of the past, but also, and more importantly, as a history of the present 
whereby sense is made, through the monster template, of contemporary outsider 
figures: admixed embryos, conjoined twins and transgender people. This interview 
with Professor Sharpe focuses on these two aspects of her scholarly work: trans-
 
1  »Transgender Marriage and the Legal Obligation to Disclose Gender History« (2012) 75(1) 
Modern Law Review 33-53.  
2  Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (London: Cavendish, 2002).  
3  Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of Law (London: Routledge, 2010).  
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gender/law relations specifically and the legal constitution and regulation of outsid-
ers more generally understood through Foucault’s monster template. 
Linnéa Wegerstad (LW): What is transgender jurisprudence? 
Alex Sharpe (AS): Transgender jurisprudence is a body of law that deals with the re-
lationship between transgender people and law in a variety of contexts. The field 
can be subdivided in different ways. However, two key concerns that emerge can be 
described as designation and discrimination. There is overlap but, broady speaking, 
designation refers to judicial or legislative determination of sex. While not inevitable 
such legal designations tend, almost without exception, to be made within a binary 
frame. The question of designation is provoked by challenge to legal classification 
and involves struggle over what counts as male and female. Questions of sex deter-
mination tend to present themselves in the context of laws where gender is consid-
ered to matter: criminal law, pension rights, social security entitlements, and so 
forth. The most important area however, and the one where legal anxiety is most 
evident, is marriage. Historically, marriage has operated as a kind of litmus test for 
the authenticity of law’s reform claims. Sometimes reform has been possible in rela-
tion to some legal subject matters but not marriage. In order to understand this we 
need to recognise state opposition to gay and lesbian marriage and judicial, legisla-
tive and wider cultural conflation between (trans)gender and (homo)sexuality. There 
is a long history that helps make sense of this conflation, one that implicates but 
precedes the institutions and discourses of sexology and psychoanalysis. Conversely, 
discrimination requires consideration of the ways in which transgender people are 
afforded legal protection. In contrast to a legal focus on sex, or the designation 
question, anti-discrimination laws that protect transgender people side-step the 
question of sex in a binary sense through providing protection on the basis of 
transgender status or, less aptly, sexuality, or through interpretation of sex discrim-
ination to include discrimination on the basis of transgender status.4 Accordingly, it 
is the question of discrimination rather than designation that has enabled the great-
er expression of gender non-conformity. However, I do not mean to romanticise law 
in the context of discrimination. On the contrary, courts have sought to shore up 
heteronormativity in various ways in moments of inaugurating anti-discrimination 
law measures. 
 
4  A. Sharpe, Transgender Performance and the Discriminating Gaze: A Critique of Anti-
Discrimination Regulatory Regimes’ (1999) 8(1) Social and Legal Studies: An International 
Journal 5-24).  
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Niklas Selberg (NS): What are the tensions in research contributing to trans-
gender jurisprudence?  
AS: I suppose there are many tensions: theoretical, ethical, political, ontological. For 
example, much of transgender scholarship both within law and beyond draws heavi-
ly on Queer and poststructural theory. This has provoked criticism from some trans 
people who object to what they see as Queer’s appropriation of trans as its emblem-
atic marker. This raises ethical questions especially when trans is deployed for non-
trans purposes on the sexual political terrain. Equally, and relatedly, there is concern 
that trans is reduced to a kind of play or performance. For some, who see trans iden-
tity in more ontological terms this is deeply problematic. These are issues that di-
vide communities and are not specific to trans people. For myself, as a transgender 
woman working within the academy and within trans communities, I am acutely 
aware of some of these difficulties and fault lines. This is perhaps especially true giv-
en that my work draws heavily on poststructural theory. In this respect, I am open 
to some of these criticisms. For me, the key thing to emphasise is that if trans is to 
be understood as a socially constructed identity it is not peculiar in this respect. This 
is a feature of all identities. I think part of the problem here is the especial vulnera-
bility of trans people to the accusation of artifice, an outlook that has its own diffi-
cult history. While I recognise the difficulties that many trans people face in the 
shadow of the law, and while it might, in some contexts, be lacking in pathos to 
abandon some form of strategic essentialism,5 it needs to be emphasised that essen-
tialist arguments delimit transgender, effect hierarchies and ultimately undermine 
autonomy as they privilege a static moment, typically birth, over the idea of becom-
ing. In this regard, appeals to science need to be treated with caution as Eve Sedg-
wick has reminded us.6 
LW: Do these tensions play out in law and legal theory?  
AS: The tensions between legal understandings of identity as fixed and legal under-
standings of identity as malleable are present in trans/law contexts as well as across 
a range of other sexual political issues. Let us take sexuality as an example, and es-
pecially gay male sexuality. Here law has, over time, struggled around the 
act/identity distinction. Sometimes law has constructed gay male sexuality as a fixed 
category with a solid foundation. In fact this seems to be required, at least rhetori-
cally, in order that gay men and lesbians gain anti-discrimination law protection. 
This seems to be an effect of liberal law’s understanding of rights acquisition where-
by rights conferral presupposes the prior establishment of a coherent fixed group 
 
5  G.C. Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (London: Routledge, 1987). 
6  E. Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet (New York: Penguin, 1990).  
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identity. On the other hand, there has been a lot of legal and political anxiety con-
cerning, for example, reducing the age of consent for gay men. Part of this anxiety 
is informed by the idea that sexuality is mutable, that young men are impressiona-
ble and that their sexuality is not fully formed. So, on the one hand law fosters the 
idea that sexuality is fixed, but on the other that it clings to the notion that it re-
mains sufficiently malleable to require paternalistic intervention. There is tension in 
legal reasoning and political discourse around these sorts of issues. Sometimes the 
identity aspect of sexuality is put to the fore, while in other instances acts are fore-
grounded. Law’s struggle, and indeed ambivalence, regarding the act/identity dyad 
is also apparent in trans contexts. The distinction plays itself out around the idea of 
the natural. Thus reform judges have sought to naturalise transgender people and 
their bodies as well as the status of surgical interventions. Conversely, those judges 
that have resisted reform have sought, through particular interpretations of biologi-
cal science, to de-naturalise transgender bodies and desires. Indeed, even within re-
form jurisprudence naturalising tendencies are suspect. Reform is more interesting 
to me and, I think, revealing about legal desire. My work has always been less inter-
ested in those courts that refuse transgender claims, that interdict, prohibit, that ut-
ter the royal »no.« Much more interesting are those courts that say yes and in these 
circumstances we need to interrogate precisely the medico-legal conditions of legal 
inclusion and, of course, such conditions are always present. When we challenge lib-
eral law in moments of reform we get to glimpse something important about the 
nature of legal anxiety. We get a clearer sense of what is at stake for law in incorpo-
rating transgender people within the social and legal order. My claim that the natu-
ralising tendencies of reform courts are suspect points to an ambivalence that lies at 
the heart of the transgender/law nexus. We see this in the context of the UK legal 
provision requiring transgender people to disclose their gender history prior to a 
marriage ceremony. On the one hand, law confers gender recognition on trans-
gender people. Yet, at the same time, law’s commitment to gender recognition ap-
pears inauthentic. This is because the act of recognition is tied to the present mo-
ment whereas the disclosure provision insists on the past as truth. On the surface, it 
appears that sex/gender claims are taken seriously. Yet, in the marriage context, a 
biological understanding of sex as truth reasserts itself thereby undercutting present 
sex/gender status that, at least ostensibly, enjoys the imprimatur of law. And, of 
course, this tension draws us back to legal anxiety.  
LW: Where does this anxiety come from?  
AS: This is an important question! It is also important not to reduce the answer to a 
single factor. However, it appears to me that homophobia and the legal and cultural 
conflation of transgender and homosexuality are central to grasping legal anxiety 
around transgender people, their bodies and desires. Indeed, homophobia appears to 
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operate as a subtext throughout the corpus of the law that is transgender jurispru-
dence. This seems to be especially apparent in the marriage context. To return to 
the example of non-disclosure of gender history before a marriage we have, for ex-
ample, a situation where a person who is legally recognised to be female marries a 
man. According to law, this is an opposite sex and therefore heterosexual relation-
ship. Yet, the sexual encounter imagined, indeed anticipated, is not really viewed as 
heterosexual in the fullest sense. Doubt continues to linger in the legal mind. In this 
sense the spectre of homosexuality haunts transgender reform moments. The possi-
bility of inadvertent communion with homosexuality underwrites the disclosure 
provision. It is what the provision is designed to protect against. The problematisa-
tion of heterosexuality here follows from the fact that law remains ambivalent about 
the sex/gender status it has conferred. At the heart of the problem lies the legal and 
cultural conflation of transgender and homosexuality. This, of course, has a longer 
history. If we go back to before the so-called gender revolution of the 18th century,7 
being a man who desired men did not equate with being feminine. That is, it did 
not call masculinity into question. We see this clearly in the figure of the Rake. 
During the 18th century, same-sex desire and masculinity gradually became uncou-
pled in a wider cultural sense. This equation of »failed« masculinity with homosexu-
ality became further entrenched with the emergence of sexology and psychoanalysis. 
It is a conflation that continues to circulate today despite resistance to it and it car-
ries over in transgender contexts.  
NS: I’m thinking of your article about the obligation to disclose gender hi-
story. Would you say that abolishing this obligation would make marriage an 
unproblematic institution in society? 
AS: No, I wouldn’t say that! There are many reasons for thinking of marriage as a 
problematic institution. Repealing the provision has more to do with issues of equal-
ity and countering notions of transgender people as gender ambiguous, sexually 
harmful and ethically suspect.  
NS: You touch upon anti-discrimination legislation in this article. This kind 
of legislation operates by defining legal categories which can change over 
time. From the perspective of law reform groups, what are the advantages of, 
and pitfalls associated with, this legal fact? 
AS: There is a tension here. On the one hand, the creation of a protected category 
creates rights and provides a form of redress for a disadvantaged group. On the oth-
 
7  R. Trumbach, Sex and the Gender Revolution (vol 1) Heterosexuality and the Third Gender in En-
lightenment London (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998).  
90 RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 35 2012 NR. 3/138 
Niklas Selberg & Linnéa Wegerstad 
er hand, conferral of anti-discrimination law rights within liberal legal regimes al-
ways comes at a cost. Here I am speaking of inclusion/exclusion. You state in your 
question that legal categories can change over time. This is true. But at any particu-
lar point in time one is either inside or outside the relevant category. For example, 
transgender women have been, and in some jurisdictions still are, considered to fall 
outside the category female either as a general proposition or on the basis of failure 
to comply with particular medico-legal conditions, most notably, surgical condi-
tions. Thus the category female has been understood to exclude transgender women 
as a class and then subsequently to include some, but not other, transgender wom-
en. Moreover, it is not only law that is implicated here. We need to recognise the 
agency of law reform groups that are complicitous in producing these kinds of out-
comes. This raises a question of ethics in the context of identity-based forms of po-
litical activism. By the same token, we need to recognise that an effect of law’s cate-
gorical imperative is to foster tensions within social movements and undermine pos-
sibilities for cooperation. In addition to the policing of category boundaries whereby 
some individuals who locate themselves within a group are legally positioned out-
side it, we have the additional problem that in relation to some groups law refuses 
to provide protection. Here I am not speaking about dispute over group member-
ship, but about law’s refusal to protect entire groups of people. Moreover, this diffi-
culty is a direct effect of law’s categorical imperative within liberal legal orders. 
Conferral of anti-discrimination law rights proves contingent on a group seeking 
protection establishing that it is a fixed or immutable group. We should challenge 
this linkage between rights and immutability. We should be able to say: »We have 
a group, group X, they are discriminated against, we can document a history of dis-
crimination against this group over time, at the hands of the dominant group and 
that should be enough, without having to say that this group is fixed in some more 
immutable, ontological or essentialist way. For example, in the UK today there is is 
no protection afforded on the basis of class or weight. Of course, people are discrim-
inated against on the basis of class and weight. But because these categories are seen 
as fluid protection is withheld. Discourses around consumption and the ideology of 
meritocracy reproduce the idea that weight and class are to some extent random 
outcomes. In a related register, this kind of categorical imperative reifies, indeed 
naturalises, categories that might be better viewed as social constructs. While 
weight and class are seen as moveable targets, sex, race, sexuality, disability and so 
forth are seen as concrete or relatively concrete categories. Yet, even the most curso-
ry examination of such claims reveals their limits. For example, lets take sex or, 
more specifically, the male/female dyad. This is perhaps the most axiomatic, natu-
ralised and culturally unproblematic of social distinctions. Yet, the scientific fact of 
RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 35 2012 NR. 3/138 91 
 Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 
intersex gives the game away. Clearly, at the level of science, if not culture, there are 
more than two sexes. This observation serves to dramatise Judith Butler’s claim that 
gender is the ideology that produces sex.8  
LW: Talking about your article on transgender marriage, what strikes me is 
that the arguments you put forward rely on law and the coherence of law, 
which are a very traditional way of legal arguing. Why did you choose that 
method?  
AS: I think external and internal critiques are both important to the study of law. 
In terms of internal critique, I think it is important to take law and legal rules seri-
ously. This is important because, as in the present context, doing so is an important 
avenue to legal change. It is also important to challenge law and legal rules from a 
perspective internal to law because a purely external critique runs the danger of re-
ducing law to politics or fails to grasp the politics that is or has become internal to 
law. It is also critically important to recognise that law and legal power are not 
simply about obligation and sanction. Rather, a key aspect of an internal critique of 
law lies in teasing out and challenging its cultural power. In terms of the disclosure 
of gender history issue, law not only creates a legal requirement and sanction. The 
provision also produces discursive fallout. It does so through reproducing the no-
tions that transgender people are sexually harmful, gender ambiguous and ethically 
suspect. These legal representations, which circulate both within and beyond law, 
need to be resisted.  
NS: I really liked the arguments put forward in your article. I think on the 
internal matter, on the »arguing like a lawyer« part, you managed to short 
circuit the law on its own premises. You successfully deploy consistency, 
public policy, analogy and also the hierarchical perspective with the Euro-
pean Convention. But where I think you really did a good job here. Where do 
the problems with law come from? Is it bad lawyers? Perhaps they haven’t 
read their convention correctly? Is it what they have to work with?  
AS: I don’t think the problem is one of bad lawyers. If we stay with the transgender 
issue that we have been discussing I think the problem lies in cultural understand-
ings of transgender bodies and desires. These understandings both inform legal rea-
soning and are informed by it. A view of transgender people as gender ambiguous 
or as gender uncertain finds support in dominant and binary understandings of sex 
that permeate our culture and law. A view of transgender people as sexually harm-
 
8  J. Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (London: Routledge, 1993). 
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ful is inextricably tied up with homophobia. And a view of transgender people as 
ethically suspect is informed by the idea that truth is tied to a particular configura-
tion of biological factors at the moment of birth. In other words, judges might be 
viewed as drawing on and reproducing what is understood to be axiomatic, self-
evident and natural both with law and the wider culture. What is at play here then 
is the ideology or politics of gender. It is again important to recognise how politics 
is internal to law. Moreover, the penetration of law by this type of politics is so old 
that the distinction between law and politics in this context is, perhaps, hardly 
worth making. When liberal law makes claims to universality, impartiality and neu-
trality it disavows a gender politics that is its own. Thus when the lawyer or judge 
tries to distinguish between law and politics the attempt is flawed but not disingen-
uous. Here lies the problem which is one of deeply embedded assumptions. And, of 
course, it is the most deeply entrenched assumptions that we need to tackle. This is 
part of Foucault’s legacy.  
LW: That leads me nicely into the next question. Perhaps we can talk a little 
about your most recent book Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of Law. 
You describe the monster as a legal template, as someone who is located out-
side the law. What is the role of law in creating the monster? How does Fou-
cault articulate the monster? What are its constituent features?  
AS: The category monster comes from Roman Law. Thus it has its source in the 
law. In that sense it is a legal category; it has a legal life, a legal history. It is not 
something that comes from outside the law, like, for example, Baumann’s stranger. 
In terms of Foucault’s understanding of the monster, Foucault understands the cat-
egory as a way of delineating bodies that have been placed outside the law from 
those that remain within its domain. In Roman law there is, as Foucault notes, a 
distinction between deformity and monstrosity. The deformed or disabled are peo-
ple whose rights might be restricted in some way, but they are not entirely restrict-
ed. Law accommodates them in various ways. In other words, deformity can be 
viewed as representing the limit of law’s capacity to incorporate or include. So the 
distinction is really one between problematic bodies that law can accommodate or 
incorporate into its order and those bodies that not only challenge law but threaten 
to bring it to a point of crisis. The only way to deal with the monster is to deny it a 
place within the law lest law itself be corrupted or dissolved. Of course, the monster 
also functions for law. It is impossible but at the same time recuperative. This is be-
cause the monster is essentially a hybrid creature, it blurs boundaries. Through plac-
ing it outside the law, binary categories of the law are thereby maintained. In terms 
of the sufficient and necessary conditions of monster production, Foucault draws our 
attention to a nature/law nexus. For Foucault, the monster is an effect of a double 
breach, of nature and law. A breach of nature occurs when a body is viewed as being 
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sufficiently irregular. However, an irregular body only becomes a monster when it is 
considered to pose a fundamental challenge to law, and specifically to legal order or 
taxonomy. By way of example, Foucault identifies the bestial human, the so-called 
privileged monster of the late Middle Ages. This figure which is part human, part 
beast, was considered to represent a breach of nature on account of its high degree 
of bodily irregularity. In terms of law, the creature undermined one of law’s central 
axioms, the distinction between human and animal. Accordingly, it was considered 
a monster until we could no longer suspend our disbelief in a bestiality thesis. Inter-
estingly, the human/animal hybrid has returned as an object of concern in the con-
text of developments in genetic science. 
NS: How is the emergence of monsters to be understood in historical terms? 
What is the relationship monsters bear to power relations? And what types of 
monster does Foucault identify?  
AS: These are interesting questions. In the first place, monsters are specific to time 
and place. That is to say, they are historically contingent. While they have persisted 
over time, both as source of anxiety and prop to the human subject, the intensity of 
concern they have generated as well as the shape they have assumed has proved de-
pendent on prevailing power relations. In this regard, the question of monsters is 
not only psychological or fantasmatic. It is also socio-political. Let’s take an exam-
ple, the entry of monsters into English legal texts in the mid-thirteenth century. 
Prior to Bracton’s Laws of England there was no mention of monsters in English 
law.9 So the question that arises is: how did this happen? This is, of course, a 
properly historical question and I intend here only to identify some important 
themes. Of course, one could point to the rediscovery of Justinian’s texts and there-
fore to the legacy of Roman law. Historians have however emphasised the fact that, 
unlike Continental Europe, the reception of Roman law was a partial affair in Eng-
land. In order to make sense of the entry of monsters into English law in the mid-
thirteenth century we need to understand the social and political upheavals of the 
period and the anxieties which they generated. This was not a period of social calm. 
It was a time of religious wars, of crusades and, more significantly, the loss to Islam 
of the third crusade; a fact that weighed heavily on the Western imagination. It was 
a time when nation states started to take shape, to grow buds, a time when the 
Church of Rome sought to reassert its power and a time when Jews were expelled 
from England. It was a time when sodomy, not previously subject to the death pen-
alty, became a capital offence throughout most of modern day Europe. So monsters 
make their appearance in English law at a time of multiple crises in the West. Later, 
 
9  H. Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 1240-1260, vols 1-4 (trans, S.E. Thorne) 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).  
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in the late-sixteenth century English context, we can look to the writings of the 
canon lawyer, Henry Swinburne, to illuminate the social and political forces that 
help account for the emergence of, and particular shape taken by, law’s monsters.10 
Swinburne wrote after the English reformation and for it. He talks about dog, duck 
and raven-headed monsters. The animals that are depicted, the ass, the raven and 
the dog, are particularly interesting. The dog was understood to be a sign of the 
devil, the ass a sign of the Jew, and the raven signified deities and the afterlife. 
There is powerful religious symbolism in these monsters. The context of reformation 
and counter-reformation give particular shape and colour to the monsters England 
imagined. In short, monsters appear to emerge at times of crisis and conflict: na-
tional, religious, sexual and so forth. For Foucault, the key periods he identified 
were the late Middles Ages, the Renaissance and the Classical period and the mon-
sters he saw as privileged by European societies within those periods were respec-
tively, the bestial human, conjoined twins and the hermaphrodite. These respective-
ly represent crises of species differentiation, legal personhood and sex. 
LW: Could you say something about monsters today? Is it still meaningful to 
use this category as a mode of analysis?  
AS: In terms of Foucault’s monster, the fundamental thing to grasp is the na-
ture/law-nexus as I have already indicated. The monster exists when nature is 
breached, and the breach of nature simultaneously undermines law in a fundamen-
tal way, in the taxonomical, categorical sense. It is for this reason that Foucault’s 
monster framework is particularly useful. In terms of bodies, it can no longer cover 
hermaphrodites (or intersex people) because, although the notion that intersex bod-
ies are significantly irregular persists, and this could be interpreted to meet Fou-
cault’s breach of nature requirement, it can no longer be said that those bodies cause 
a crisis for law. While this was possible prior to the emergence of the two-sex medi-
cal model in the eighteenth century, subsequently medicine insisted on a binary un-
derstanding of sex.11 According to this model, a third sex is more apparent than re-
al. The task of physicians became one of determining true sex within a binary un-
derstanding. On the other hand, Foucault’s framework could be said to persist in its 
application to conjoined twins. Again, and for the reasons already given regarding 
intersex people, a claim about breach of nature could still be made. In relation to 
law, breach might also be established because, although we understand the causes of 
conjoined twins today, conjoinment still represents a challenge to the categorical 
 
10  H. Swinburne, A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills, 1590 (New York, Garland Pub-
lishing, 1978).  
11  T. Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990) Chp 5.  
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structure of law. That is, conjoined twins challenge the legal idea of personhood as a 
single embodied mind. It is also important to recognise that Foucault’s idea of the 
monster is not limited to the physical body. Rather, it also applies to the psyche. 
Thus for Foucault, a double breach of nature and law is apparent in the context of 
the abnormal individual, a figure whose emergence he dates to the nineteenth cen-
tury. This »diluted monster« to quote Foucault, is a monster precisely because s/he 
can be understood within the context of a double breach of nature and law. For ex-
ample, the homosexual can be understood in terms of nature gone awry evidenced 
by »perverse« desire/practice. The challenge to law lies in the threat posed to the 
heteronormative gender order. I am not suggesting that gay men and lesbians and 
others previously considered abnormal within discourses of sexology and psycho-
analysis fit within Foucault’s monster framework today. They certainly have been, 
and they continue to be vulnerable to the possibility of monsterisation. Indeed, in 
many law reform contexts, the persistence of discourses around the natural, in con-
junction with the state’s commitment to heteronormativity, points to this dilemma.  
LW: How does your reading of Foucault’s monsters relate to other contem-
porary modes of understanding power relations or social differentiation and 
exclusion?  
AS: What I am interested in is outsiders and in particular how they are produced or 
constituted through law. This is really a central theme in all of my work and cer-
tainly in the Transgender Jurisprudence and Foucault’s Monsters books. In writing 
Foucault’s Monsters I was especially interested to pinpoint the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for outsider production. Of course, there are several available tem-
plates for thinking about outsiders available within law, such as the idiot, the luna-
tic and the deformed or disabled, as well as within social theory: Girard’s scape-
goat12 and Bauman’s stranger13 being two of the more obvious examples. When I 
started to read Foucault’s abnormal lecture series,14 which is central to the analysis 
adopted in the book, I found the monster template to be particularly useful. Choices 
like this, and choices over research method, are informed by the concerns you have 
and the questions you pose. In the first place, coming from the point of view of be-
ing interested in gender and sexuality and the body, as Foucault himself was, and 
given the strong relationship between monsters, especially Foucault’s monsters, and 
sexuality, this template presented itself as an option with appeal. But irrespective of 
 
12  R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1977; The 
Scapegoat (Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).  
13  Z. Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991); Postmodernity and its 
Discontents (New York: New York University Press, 1997).  
14  M. Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France 1974-1975 (London: Verso, 2003).  
96 RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 35 2012 NR. 3/138 
Niklas Selberg & Linnéa Wegerstad 
these links, I believe Foucault’s monster framework offers something other available 
templates do not. What Foucault offers is a certain kind of precision and delinea-
tion. His monsters are discrete and more easily identifiable. By way of contrast, 
Girard’s scapegoat and Baumann’s stranger offer a very generalised account that 
seems capable of including practically anybody and everybody. So I found Foucault 
more useful and more analytically precise. The monster also has appeal because it 
perhaps precedes and perhaps breathes life into alternative templates. In this sense, 
the monster may represent a kind of master category. I hesitate to use this phrase 
which sounds anything but Foucauldian. Certainly, Foucault himself viewed the ab-
normal individual as a descendant of the monster, as a figure shaped by the na-
ture/law logic of the monster. Perhaps this is true of other outsider templates? 
What we need are genealogies of the scapegoat, of the stranger and so forth. What 
I’m saying is that the monster is perhaps the un-distilled outsider – that’s a nice 
phrase, I should have used it in the book. I think some of these other figures are 
more distilled. Foucault talks about the abnormal individual as a diluted monster 
which captures this kind of idea. The monster however is the pure outsider, or as 
close as we can get to it. Because no one is ever absolutely other, there are degrees 
of otherness. The monster can never be absolutely other because, given that it is 
premised on the fact of hybridity, it must be at least part human and recognisably 
so. Nevertheless, the monster is the figure interpreted to bear the greatest degree of 
difference from an ontologically pure human subject. This renders the template par-
ticularly valuable and illuminating for thinking about constructions of a coherent 
human subject given that all outsiders operate as foils.  
LW: Does the monster category say more about what it means to be human 
than it does about monsters per se?  
AS: I think that’s a very good question. Of course, the answer must be yes. Mon-
sters only really make sense in relation to the human which they presuppose. Mon-
sters can be viewed as a series of claims about human coherence and intelligibility 
and simultaneously, and correspondingly, as expressions of doubt about those very 
claims. Perhaps of particular interest is the relationship human status has to the 
mind/body distinction when viewed from the perspective of legal monsters. In con-
trast to the privileging of mind over body, something tantamount to an axiom 
within Western philosophy and law, my analysis of English legal monsters reveals 
that the body is more important than the mind as a threshold of human status. This 
is really very interesting given that it appears to be counter-intutitive. Perhaps the 
point is best illustrated by examples. If we take the legal categories idiot or lunatic, 
we find that no degree of mental incapacity could lead to the designation monster. 
In other words, the mind, no matter how compromised, could ever translate a 
healthy body into a monster. Conversely, a body that was considered to be too ir-
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regular could be so translated irrespective of its reasoning abilities. In short, the 
body emerges as the bedrock of what it means to be human and does so consistently 
through five centuries of English legal texts on monsters. This finding is relevant to 
theories of personhood and to politics, including Feminist politics, around the body. 
It is certainly a provocation.  
NS: What is the relationship between Foucault’s Monsters and the possibility 
of law reform?  
AS: I think I would respond as Foucault might to this sort of question. Foucault al-
ways explained himself as providing groups with tools, and it was for them to decide 
how to use them, and it was not for him to tell people what to do. He was engaged 
in a series of ground clearing exercises. He took the taken for granted and challeng-
ing it at its core and showed ways of doing and thinking differently. That we are 
not conditioned by the past. That we can break the chain, overcome the weight of 
history. I hope that this book is Foucauldian in that sense. If the book is about law 
reform or, at least, politics, it is so in the sense that it points to the need to chal-
lenge law’s binary structures and the legal deployment of the trope of nature. For 
what Foucault’s monsters reveal about legal exclusion is that it is an effect of an in-
terpretation of nature and law as having been doubly breached. For law reformers, it 
represents a cautionary tale, one that urges care in relation to the development of 
arguments and strategies that revolve around law’s categorical structures and dis-
courses of nature.  
NS: In the last sentence of your book you state that you want to contribute 
»to this political project of resistance«.15 What do you mean by this? How 
might resistance be informed by insights generated by Foucault’s Monsters? 
AS: The book points to the cultural power of law and the need to contest law at this 
level. Its novelty lies in teasing out more precisely the specific legal claims that need 
to be challenged. As I have already made clear, law insists on the inevitability of 
particular binary categories, such as male and female, and on the »unnaturalness« of 
particular bodies. In doing so, it produces monsters: the unnatural objects that lie 
outside its domain. There are at least two types of strategy that might be adopted in 
the face of this legal challenge. First, and most obviously, one might pursue a strat-
egy of what might be described as de-monsterisation. This would involve insisting 
on two things: the possibility/desirability of a third term and the renaturalisation of 
bodies. The latter, though not the former, is a strategy that law reform courts have 
 
15  A. Sharpe, Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of Law (London: Routledge, 2010) 152.  
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already adopted in the context of transgender jurisprudence. Second, one could in-
stead embrace the monster. Lets call this a strategy of monsterisation. However, I 
think these to be two sides of the same coin. This is because the de-monsterisation 
approach necessarily opens up and expands what counts as natural, thereby chip-
ping away at the logic of the distinction. Further, and perhaps more importantly, 
de-monsterisation lends itself not only to claiming bodies as fully human within bi-
nary categories of law, but also, and crucially, to the assertion of third terms. In this 
latter respect, and in the context of the liberal legal imagination, this is a call to the 
monster. It represents perhaps an endorsement of pluralism par excellence.  
 
  
 
